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Abstract
In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based mod-
els (ABMs) of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical
literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni’s (2005) classification of
ABMs into case-based models, typifications and theoretical abstrac-
tions, I argue that proposed ABMs of scientific inquiry largely belong
to the third category. While this means that their function is pri-
marily exploratory, I suggest that they are epistemically valuable not
only as a temporary stage in the development of ABMs of science, but
by providing insights into theoretical aspects of scientific rationality.
I illustrate my point with two examples of highly idealized ABMs of
science, which perform two exploratory functions: Zollman’s (2010)
ABM which provides a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical
discussions on scientific rationality, and ArgABM (Borg et al., 2017b,
2018a,b), which provides insights into potential mechanisms underly-
ing the efficiency of scientific inquiry.
1 Introduction
Computational modeling has in recent years become an increasingly popular
method for the study of social aspects of scientific inquiry. In particular,
agent-based models (ABMs) have been used as simulations of scientific in-
quiry, allowing for the examination of various socio-epistemological issues:
from tensions between individual and group rationality (Grim, 2009; Grim
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et al., 2013; Zollman, 2007, 2010), to different social mechanisms that impact
the efficiency of inquiry (Holman and Bruner, 2015; Weatherall, O’Connor,
and Bruner, 2018), to different research strategies (Alexander, Himmelre-
ich, and Thompson, 2015; Pöyhönen, 2017; Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009),
etc. A common feature of ABMs developed in philosophy of science is that
they are simple, ‘thin’ representations of scientific inquiry (Pöyhönen and
Kuorikoski, 2016). The primary appeal of such models is that they allow for
an easy insight into possible causal mechanisms underlying the phenomenon
in question. The less components a model includes, the easier it gets to study
causal dependencies between the given components. Nevertheless, such sim-
plicity comes at a price: the model will likely end up being highly idealized,
making it difficult to determine its relation to the real world. More precisely,
the more idealized a model is, the harder it gets to exactly determine target
phenomena it represents.
Despite their highly idealized character, many of the ABMs proposed in
the literature have been motivated by concrete episodes from the history of
science, suggesting potential explanations of the given cases (Holman and
Bruner, 2015; O’Connor and Weatherall, 2017; Weatherall, O’Connor, and
Bruner, 2018; Zollman, 2010). This has had two significant consequences
for the reception of ABMs of science. On the one hand, these models have
been considered to be primarily aiming at explaining real-world phenomena
or at least providing ‘how-possibly explanations’ or ‘proofs of possibility’
that should be applicable to the given cases. On the other hand, the lack
of robustness analysis of the given findings has cast doubt on their link to
real-world phenomena, and hence on the relevance of these results for actual
scientific inquiry (even in a how-possibly way).1 As a result, it has been
suggested that the vast majority of ABMs developed in philosophy of science
are currently only exploratory, rather than explanatory (Frey and Šešelja,
2018b), and that they need to be ‘thickened’ and enhanced by empirical data
to provide insights into actual scientific inquiry (Martini and Pinto, 2016).
Altogether, the current state of ABMs of science is such that it is unclear
what their exact function is, unless we link them more directly to real-world
phenomena.2 The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I examine
different strategies of relating ABMs of science to actual scientific practice
and I specify challenges that these strategies face. On the other hand, I
introduce a classification of ABMs of science, which will help in providing
1Similar worries have been directed at ABMs in social sciences, see e.g. Arnold, 2014.
2Beside explanation and exploration there may be various other functions of ABMs,
see Edmonds, 2017; Edmonds et al., 2018.
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a clear epistemic function to highly-idealized exploratory models without
necessarily assigning them a mere temporary stage. The basic idea behind
the latter is that ABMs may be explanatory of theoretical phenomena, which
are nevertheless interesting as conceptual explorations of scientific rationality
taken in abstracto.
I will start with Boero and Squazzoni’s (2005) classification of ABMs in
general, and with a critical look to it, classify ABMs of scientific inquiry
(Section 2). In Section 3 I discuss some of the central procedures neces-
sary for relating these ABMs to actual scientific practice. In Section 4 I
assess ABMs proposed in the philosophical literature in view of the preced-
ing discussion and argue that they are theoretical abstractions, performing
exploratory roles. In Section 5 I illustrate these functions in terms of two
examples: Zollman’s (2010) model, and the argumentative ABM of scientific
inquiry (Borg et al., 2017a,b, 2018a,b). While the first model plays the role
of providing a proof of possibility in the realm of scientific rationality, the
second model plays the role of pointing to new hypotheses about mechanisms
relevant for the efficiency of scientific inquiry. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Classifying ABMs of science
To explicate the difference between simple (or ‘thin’) and complex (or ‘thick’)
models,3 it is useful to take a look at the classification of ABMs introduced
by Boero and Squazzoni, 2005, in terms of the degree of specificity of the
purported target, and the degree of complexity of the given model. The
authors distinguish between case-based ABMs, typifications and theoretical
abstractions—on the spectrum ranging from complex and specific models
to simple and general ones. While the two dimensions of classification—
specificity and complexity—may not necessarily coincide (as I’ll argue later
on in this section), of special interest for our current purposes is the dimen-
sion of specificity of the purported target. Let’s take a closer look at each of
these categories and see how they apply to ABMs of science.
On one end of the spectrum, we have case-based ABMs of scientific in-
quiry, aiming to represent concrete cases from the scientific practice. Their
target is thus a phenomenon that is restricted in terms of space and time
and other empirical information, specific for the given case of scientific in-
quiry. As such, these ABMs tend to be ‘thick’ representations of science
since they are calibrated towards the given empirical scenario and hence,
3Thanks to Daniel Singer for bringing to my attention adjectives ‘thin’ and ‘thick’,
which are sometimes used to describe simple and complex ABMs.
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they will include a variety of details relevant for it.4
The second type of ABMs—typifications—aim to represent a class of em-
pirical phenomena. They aim at capturing key properties of the given type,
while abstracting away from particularities of each individual phenomenon.
Hence, a model designed to represent a certain type of scientific inquiry (for
instance, an inquiry characterized by deceptive information sharing among
scientists, or an inquiry that occurs in the context of theoretical diversity),
would fall in this category, characterized by mid-level specificity.
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum we have theoretical abstrac-
tions: these are simple, highly idealized models, which often have purely ex-
ploratory function: testing new ideas, extending existing frameworks, etc.5
As I suggest below, most ABMs in recent philosophical literature fall into
this category.6
While Boero and Squazzoni assume that complexity correlates with speci-
ficity, and simplicity with generality, this may not necessarily be the case.
As Bruce Edmonds has argued (Edmonds and Moss, 2004), simplifying a
model won’t necessarily make it more general. Edmonds suggests that sim-
plification will lead to a greater generality of the model only if it satisfies
one of the following conditions:
• When what is simplified away is essentially irrelevant to
the outcomes of interest (e.g. when there is some averaging
process over a lot of random deviations)
• When what is simplified away happens to be constant for
all the situations considered (e.g. gravity is always 9.8m/s2
downwards)
• When you loosen your criteria for being approximately right
hugely as you simplify (e.g. mover from a requirement that
results match some concrete data to using the model as a
vague analogy for what is happening)
4For instance, an ABM of scientific collaboration presented by Zamzami and Schif-
fauerova, 2017, which aims at examining knowledge transmission and productivity of
inquiry, is calibrated on nanotechnology journal publications in Canada, and hence, it can
be considered a case-based ABM.
5For a discussion on different exploratory functions of models see Gelfert, 2016, Chapter
4, for exploratory functions of simulations see Arnold, 2008, Chapter 6 (see also Footnote
18).
6The most common example of this class of ABMs in social sciences is Schelling’s model
of social segregation (Schelling, 1971).
4
In other cases, where you compare like with like (i.e. you don’t
move the goalposts such as in (3) above) then it only works if you
happen to know what can be safely simplified away. (Edmonds,
2018)
Hence, the link from simplicity to generality requires evidence, or at least
an explication showing that one of the above conditions has been satisfied.
Furthermore, complex models are not necessarily more specific. A higher
number of parameters may increase the complexity of a model, but there is
no reason to assume that this implies a narrower scope of the target phe-
nomenon. Whether the target is narrow or wide is an independent question,
which can be determined only by means of adequate validation procedures.
The next section tackles this issue.
3 ABM validation: determining the adequate tar-
get
The literature on the validation of ABMs is vast (for recent discussions see
Casini and Manzo, 2016; Gräbner, 2018; Thicke, 2018). The aim of this
section is not to give an exhaustive list of validation methods suggested to
this end.7 For the current purposes it will suffice to give an overview of some
of the central strategies that have been suggested in this context, and which
are necessary if we wish to argue that a given ABM of scientific inquiry is
a case-based model or a typification. For either of these ABM types, what
needs to be validated is the link between the model and a given class of
empirical phenomena (in case of typifications) or a concrete phenomenon
(in case of case-based ABMs). Such a phenomenon is specified in the inter-
pretation of the ABM as its purported target. The following two types of
mutually interwoven processes represent central methodologies of validation:
on the one hand, robustness analysis, and on the other hand, the process of
empirically embedding the model.
Before I turn to them, a brief look at possible targets of simulations is in
place. First, we can imagine a simulation that is descriptively adequate (e.g.
representing a particular case-study) and which may be of sociological inter-
est. However, such a simulation will be philosophically interesting only if we
can use it to examine counterfactual dependencies, in view of which we can
draw normative conclusions about the given phenomenon. In other words,
7In addition to validation, ABMs also require a process of verification, the aim of which
is to evaluate how accurate the program of the model is (see e.g. Cooley and Solano, 2011).
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simulations become useful for philosophical purposes once they represent a
space of possibilities. Since such possibilities can range from empirical to
merely logical ones,8 the main challenge for drawing information that is rel-
evant for the real-world phenomena is determining which kind of possibility
the model represents. That is, unless we can specify which context precisely
a given model represents, it will be impossible to draw information con-
cerning counterfactual dependencies, such that we can reliably relate them
to real-world phenomena. Unsurprisingly, this is especially challenging in
case of highly idealized models, where it is unclear how ‘counterfactually
distant’ from the real world a given model is. The following procedures help
in addressing this challenge.
3.1 Robustness analysis
Two particularly relevant types of robustness analysis are the following ones:
a) Sensitivity analysis: this is a method of examining the robustness
of results under changes in parameters of the model (Thiele, Kurth, and
Grimm, 2014). It is used to determine the scope of parameters within which
results of simulations remain stable.
b) Derivational robustness analysis: this is a method of examining the
robustness of results under the changes in idealizing assumptions of the model
(Lehtinen, 2017; Railsback and Grimm, 2011; Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014,
p. 302-306). Since the robustness analysis of this kind can be rather complex
and tedious, rather than starting from the model and altering each of its
assumptions separately, it may be more efficient to examine the robustness of
results by employing an altogether new model, which is structurally different,
while it aims at the same target phenomenon.
While the robustness analysis serves to explore the stability of results
under various changes of the model, an output of such an analysis will not
necessarily help us in validating the link between the model and its purported
target. On the one hand, if the robustness analysis shows that the results are
highly stable and that they hold under numerous changes, this may indicate
that the model is representative of a large scope of phenomena, which makes
it more likely that it also represents the specific target in question. On the
other hand, the results may indeed be sensitive to a variety of parameter
changes, in which case we need some interpretative tools to determine which
results are representative of which phenomenon exactly. For instance, if it
turns out that the results of a certain ABM of scientific inquiry hold only
8See Verreault-Julien, 2018 for a discussion on different types of how-possibly explana-
tions and their relation to the represented possibilities.
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under certain parameter values, then we need some way of translating the
parameters in the model into real-world values in order to determine what
exactly the model tells us about actual scientific practice. In other words,
what is needed is a link between the model and empirical information. This
is done by empirically embedding the model.
3.2 Empirical embeddedness
In order to guide the robustness analysis towards the purported target phe-
nomena of case-based ABMs and typifications, our methods need to be em-
pirically embedded. Casini and Manzo, 2016 suggest three trends in the
literature on ABMs, which have been used to this end:9 a trend towards the-
oretical realism, a trend towards empirical calibration and a trend towards
empirical validation. Let’s see how these strategies apply to the validation
of ABMs of scientific inquiry.
a) The first strategy—enhancing theoretical realism—suggests that mod-
els be built in view of relevant psychological and sociological theories (Casini
and Manzo, 2016, p. 23). We may add that with respect to ABMs of science,
an important source of such theoretical background are accounts proposed
in traditional methodology of science and social epistemology. Hence, when
deciding how to represent different aspects of inquiry, and which simplifi-
cations may turn out problematic, we may profit from ideas proposed in
this literature. For instance, if we are modeling decision-making of scientists
concerning which lines of inquiry they are to pursue, different assessments
discussed by philosophers of science can be useful.10 Similarly, if a model
aims at representing the context of scientific disagreements, insights from the
literature on peer disagreement may be helpful.11 This information can be
9More precisely, the authors discuss these trends as conducive to the validation of
models and their capacity to warrant causal inference. They also note that due to prac-
tical limitations these strategies may not always be available, in which case ABM vali-
dation should proceed by means of theoretical explorations, which include the two above
mentioned robustness analysis, as well as ‘dispersion analysis’ (the examination of the
stochastic character of the results) and ‘model analysis’ (the examination of events, be-
haviors and feedbacks executed within the model, which aim towards transparency of the
coded processes).
10For instance, Nickles’ (2006) distinction between the heuristic appraisal and epistemic
appraisal motivates the behavior of agents in an argumentation-based ABM of science
(Borg et al., 2017a,b, 2018a).
11For example, Douven, 2010 builds an ABM to examine some of the norms suggested
in the informal literature on peer disagreements. Moreover, future ABMs of scientific
disagreements could make use of the notion of higher-order evidence and its role in scientific
disagreements (Straßer, Šešelja, and Wieland, 2015), which has so far largely remained
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used for guiding the construction of both models tackling novel phenomena,
and models aimed at examining the robustness of existing ABMs.
b) The second strategy—empirically calibrating ABMs—consists in using
concrete numerical information as an input for parameters of the model. In
other words, empirical data is used to build micro-specifications of a given
ABM (Boero and Squazzoni, 2005), either when constructing novel models
or when examining the robustness of the existing ones. Such data can range
from the number of agents that represent a given scientific community, to
their specific distribution on the given epistemic landscape, to the time span
of a given inquiry, to the epistemic success of the represented scientific the-
ories, etc. There are different possible sources of such information. First,
historical knowledge about scientific episodes may be essential for an ade-
quate representation of a given case-study by a case-based ABM.12 Similarly,
historical information about different episodes may be informative of ABMs
that aim to be typifications (for instance, representing inquiry in a certain
scientific discipline). Second, sociological studies about past or contempo-
rary scientific episodes may provide valuable data for empirical calibration of
ABMs. Finally, recent study of bibliometric data is a particularly promising
avenue for empirical calibration of ABMs of science. Be it case-based ABMs
or typifications, bibliometric data may serve as an input for an average num-
ber of agents in a given domain, their distribution across different sub-topics,
their citation behavior (which may suggest lines of communication and type
of social networks across the given community), their relative impact (in
terms of citations), etc. (see e.g. Martini and Pinto, 2016; Perović et al.,
2016; Thicke, 2018).13
c) The third strategy—empirically validating ABMs—consists in the anal-
ysis and comparison of a simulated macro behavior with the real-world macro
behavior (Boero and Squazzoni, 2005). For instance, if a model aims at rep-
resenting a certain episode from the history of science, then given specific
initial conditions, the macro behavior of simulated agents should correspond
to the historical knowledge about the given case-study. Such a procedure
may be especially useful if combined with theoretical realism and empirical
calibration, which can together guide the sensitivity analysis (by examining
the macro behavior for the parameter values relevant for the given case or
type of inquiry), and the derivational robustness analysis (by examining the
absent from ABMs of science.
12For a recent example see Frey and Šešelja, 2018b who use historical information about
the mid-twentieth century research on peptic ulcer disease to examine the robustness of
Zollman’s (2010) ABM as a case-based model.
13The above mentioned model by Zamzami and Schiffauerova, 2017 is a case in point.
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output given the assumptions relevant for the given case or type of inquiry).14
4 Taking stock of ABMs of science: valid unless
proven otherwise?
Looking at ABMs developed in the field of philosophy of science15 we may
notice that the vast majority of them are designed as intentionally simple:
by simplifying the representation of scientific inquiry in terms of factors that
are included in the model we can have an easier insight into causal depen-
dencies between these factors. Moreover, how general or specific they are
has remained largely open. On the one hand, as mentioned in Section 1,
these models have frequently been taken as providing potential explanatory
mechanisms of concrete episodes from the history of science. On the other
hand, validation procedures establishing the link between models and re-
spective case studies have been typically omitted: the majority of them have
not been subjected to any systematic robustness analysis or the process of
empirical embedding, which would relate them to concrete cases of scientific
inquiry.
Moreover, for those ABMs that prima facie display a plausible social
mechanism and for which no further validation seems necessary, there is
typically the danger of triviality. If the simulation displays a process which
plausibly holds for the real-world phenomenon in virtue of our knowledge of
that phenomenon, where any further robustness analysis of the simulation
seems unnecessary, then we may ask: why run the simulation in the first
place? As Arnold, 2008 argues: "the results [of simulations] should not
already be deducible without any model or simulation from the empirical
description of the process." (p. 191).
Hence, each ABM lacking robustness analysis (i.e. sensitivity analysis and
derivational robustness analysis) cannot be reliably considered a non-trivial
case-based model or a typification. In other words, the assumption of valid-
ity unless proven otherwise is unsuitable as a guideline for the interpretation
of non-trivial ABMs. Just like with any scientific claim, justification needs
to proceed in terms of evidence (obtained by reliable methods), where the
burden of proof is on those proposing an interpretation of a model, which
assigns it a representational power with respect to real-world phenomena.
The reason why validity cannot be granted without robustness-based evi-
dence lies in the highly idealized nature of these models. Even if the model
14See, for example, Frey and Šešelja, 2018b for some initial steps in this direction.
15For instance, all the models listed in Section 1.
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seems plausible, some of its underlying assumptions may be representative
only of a relatively small subset of the given target phenomenon.16
In contrast, theoretical abstractions may not be representative of any
real-world phenomena, but they may rather show how a given socio-epistemic
mechanism occurs under certain conditions, even though such conditions
may be unlikely in any realistic context of scientific inquiry, and they may
moreover offer no clear ways of making interesting counterfactual inferences
about real-world phenomena.17
Altogether, this means that the majority of these models fall into the
category of theoretical abstractions, performing only exploratory function.18
As a result, they cannot be reliably used for making inferences about any
concrete real-world phenomena. More precisely, some consequences of the
current exploratory status of ABMs of science are:
1. They cannot be reliably used as case-based models: this means that
without systematic validation procedures (and possibly also further
enhancements) these ABMs are insufficiently reliable as representations
of any concrete case of scientific inquiry.
2. They cannot be reliably used as typifications: this means that without
systematic validation procedures (and possibly also further enhance-
ments) these ABMs are insufficiently reliable as representations of any
concrete case of scientific inquiry.
16For instance, different representations of knowledge acquisition may result in strikingly
different outcomes: e.g. representing scientists as gathering information by making pulls
(each of which is success or a failure) from a given probability distribution as in Zollman-
inspired ABMs may lead to different findings than if agents gather information about
different parts of the given rivaling theories, where some parts of each theory are defensible
or indefensible (see e.g. Borg et al., 2018b).
17It is important to notice a difference between these two types of results. On the
one hand, ABMs may generate valuable normative insights about real-world phenomena
by representing certain counterfactual scenarios. On the other hand, they may be so
idealized and simplified to the point of being too counterfactually distant from actual
scientific practice, so that no relevant inferences about actual science can be drawn from
the model.
18 Arnold, 2008 classifies simulations according to their purpose, dividing them into
those employed at the ‘conceptual level’ and those employed at the ‘application level’.
The former are then distinguished into proof-of-possibility simulations and exploratory
simulations, while the letter include predictive simulations and explanatory simulations
(p. 187). In the current paper I use the term ‘exploratory’ in the sense of Arnold’s first
larger category (conceptual level simulations) mainly because proof-of-the-principle ABMs
tend to be toy-models, not necessarily referring to any real-world phenomena, and as such,
they are exploratory of the given conceptual space.
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3. What is more, making these models more complex won’t necessarily
make them more adequate candidates for the above two categories.
While claims 1. and 2. are supported by the discussion in the previous
and this section, let me turn now to claim 3. Even though the major-
ity of highly-idealized ABMs in the philosophical literature are simple in
character, making these models more complex—by adding assumptions and
parameters—isn’t a straightforward path to their validation. Just like in
case of simple ABMs, the link between complex models and their real-world
targets needs to be warranted if the model is to become a case-based ABM
or a typification. Moreover, there is a trade-off when it comes to the kinds
of robustness analysis which pose a challenge to the validation of simple
or complex models. On the one hand, in case of simple models, a small
number of parameters makes the sensitivity analysis relatively easy. In con-
trast, derivational robustness analysis presents a challenge for simple models
since it requires a construction of new ABMs (either as enhancements of the
existing one or as newly constructed models). On the other hand, the situ-
ation with complex models is reverse: while derivational robustness analysis
can be easy at least in the sense of removing certain assumptions from the
model, sensitivity analysis poses a challenge to complex ABMs due to a large
number of parameters. To elevate this difficulty, different types of screening
procedures, which facilitate sensitivity analysis, have been suggested in the
literature on simulations (see Thiele, Kurth, and Grimm, 2014).
5 What can we learn from theoretical abstractions?
If theoretical abstractions primarily serve an exploratory function (either
by exploring a conceptual space and providing a proof-of-principle, or by
exploring a causal space of mechanisms relevant for real-world phenomena),
what exactly can we learn from them? In this section I illustrate insights of
this kind by means of two highly-idealized ABMs of science: one of which has
provided a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on the
tension between the individual and group rationality, and one of which has
provided novel insights into possible mechanisms underlying the efficiency of
scientific inquiry.
5.1 Zollman’s modeling in view of bandit problems
One of the most prominent classes of ABMs of science are Zollman’s (2007;
2010) models. Inspired by (Bala and Goyal, 1998), the models represent
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scientific inquiry by employing the so-called bandit problems. Bandit prob-
lems, well known in the field of statistics and economics, concern situations
in which a gambler (or a group of gamblers) is trying to maximize their pay-
off when confronted with multiple slot machines (bandits) that have different
probabilities of success. Analogously, we can imagine a scientist confronted
with multiple rivaling hypotheses, trying to determine which one is the best.
At the beginning of the simulation19 scientists are assigned random prior
probabilities for two rivaling hypotheses, each of which has a designated ob-
jective probability of success, unknown to the agents-scientists. Agents al-
ways choose to pursue a theory which they consider to be better. Throughout
the simulation they update their beliefs in view of their own findings, and
by receiving information from other agents with whom they are connected in
a social network.20 Zollman employs three types of social networks (the so-
called cycle, wheel and the complete graph) and his results suggest that the
degree of connectedness of the scientific community is inversely proportional
to the success of scientists in converging on the objectively better hypothesis.
The reason why a fully connected community often fails in converging on the
best hypothesis is that initial findings by scientists may be misleading, but
due to the full connectedness, they may spread quickly throughout the whole
community, resulting in a premature abandonment of the objectively better
hypothesis.
Zollman’s model is indeed highly-idealized: it abstracts away from dif-
ferent types of interactions among scientists (e.g. mere exchange of obtained
evidence vs. critical interaction), it assumes that scientists always prefer a
better hypothesis without any inertia towards their previous choice of in-
quiry, etc. Moreover, the results of his runs pass neither sensitivity anal-
ysis nor derivational robustness analysis. On the one hand, Rosenstock,
O’Connor, and Bruner, 2017 have shown that as soon as certain parame-
ter values are slightly changed (e.g. the values for the objective probability
of success assigned to two hypotheses), all networks are equally successful.
On the other hand, Frey and Šešelja, 2018a have shown that changing some
of the assumptions in the model (e.g. adding the idea that scientists don’t
abandon their current hypothesis as soon as they learn that the rivaling one
19I describe here Zollman’s (2010) model, which is a generalized version of his (2007)
one.
20Every round an agent makes 1,000 pulls, each of which can be a success or failure,
where the probability of success is given by the objective probability of success of the
respective theory. Agents then update their beliefs via Bayesian reasoning (modeled by
means of beta distributions), in view of their own success and the success of other agents
with whom they are linked in a social network.
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is superior since they have a ‘rational inertia’ towards the former) changes
Zollman’s results as well. In view of these findings, it is difficult to argue
that Zollman’s ABM represents a typical context of scientific inquiry, or that
we can draw from it normative conclusions about actual scientific practice.
Nevertheless, the model still provides philosophically valuable insights:
it illustrates a case of the tension between individual and group rationality
as a theoretical notion, that is, irrespective of how realistic such a scenario
is.21 As such, it contributes to the conceptual exploration of rationality,
where it is legitimate to push some assumptions to extreme in order to
observe their consequences. We do the same in case of epistemic modal logic,
for instance, which includes the ‘positive introspection axiom’, according to
which if one knows p then one knows that one knows p, and which has
been criticized as highly problematic (see e.g. Williamson, 2002, p. 114-
134). Yet, epistemic logic is nonetheless considered a valuable contribution
to attempts at formally modeling knowledge. As explorations of rationality
these models are philosophically valuable since they tell us something about
the theoretical phenomena they represent. In case of Zollman’s model, we
have learned about conditions under which a certain degree of connectedness
of a social network, representing information flow among scientists, may be
epistemically harmful. Whether these conditions ever occur in the real world
is a separate question.
In this sense, Zollman’s ABM provides a proof-of-possibility that individ-
ual and group rationality may not always go hand-in-hand, and that commu-
nication structure may be an underlying mechanism leading to this tension.
While his models can of course serve the purpose of grounding further en-
hancements that aim at providing normatively relevant information about
actual scientific research, it doesn’t get its epistemic value primarily from
such a temporary heuristic role. To the contrary: I suggest that its primary
role consists in explaining the above mentioned theoretical phenomenon.
5.2 Argumentation-based ABM (ArgABM)
Inspired by Abstract Argumentation Frameworks,22 Borg et al.’s (2017; 2017;
2018) model represents scientific inquiry as an argumentative exchange be-
21I am indebted to Christian Straßer for an inspiring discussion that resulted in a number
of ideas appearing in this section.
22Abstract Argumentation Frameworks were pioneered by Dung, 1995 and previously
used for the modeling of scientific debates by Šešelja and Straßer, 2013. In what follows
I give an informal overview of ArgABM. For all the details see the original papers on the
model.
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tween scientists pursuing rivaling research programs. Throughout each run of
the simulation agents-scientists explore an ‘argumentative-landscape’, grad-
ually discovering arguments in favor or against their current theory. Each
theory (or a research program) is represented as consisting of a number of ar-
guments. These arguments are represented abstractly, as nodes in a directed
graph, connected via a ‘discovery relation’. The discovery relation represents
paths that agents take when moving on the landscape, from one argument to
another. Moreover, arguments belonging to one research program can attack
arguments of one of the rivaling programs. The landscape then consists of
different argumentative (rooted) trees, with nodes as arguments23 and edges
as discovery relation, where an argument in one tree may attack an argument
in another tree (see Figure 1).
Roughly speaking, an argument in a theory is considered defended if
it is not attacked, or if there is another defended argument in the same
theory, which attacks the attacker-argument.24 Moreover, the landscape is
pre-defined in such a way that one theory is the best in the sense that it
is fully defended from all its attackers in the objective landscape. Over the
course of a run, agents gather knowledge about the objective landscape,
which consists of arguments in favor of each theory, and attacks on these
arguments. In addition to gathering knowledge on their own, they also learn
about the landscape from other agents with whom they are linked in a social
network. In view of this knowledge, agents evaluate the theories. A run is
successful if agents manage to converge on the objectively best theory.25
As the authors explicitly state, ArgABM was primarily designed as an
exploratory model, aimed at testing the robustness of previously proposed
ABMs of scientific interaction (such as Zollman’s ones). While it has more
parameters than Zollman-inspired ABMs, and it allows for more assumptions
to be integrated in the model, it still lacks the validation procedures discussed
in Section 3.
The results obtained by ArgABM suggest that more connected groups
perform significantly better than the less connected ones under a variety of
23All theories are trees of the same size, i.e. consisting of the same number of arguments.
24More precisely, we call a subset of arguments A of a given theory T admissible iff for
each attacker b of some a in A there is an a′ in A that attacks b. Since every theory in
the model is conflict-free (in the sense that no two arguments in the same theory attack
one another), it can easily be shown that for each theory T there is a unique maximally
admissible subset of T (with respect to set inclusion). An argument a in T is said to be
defended in T iff it is a member of this maximally admissible subset of T .
25The model employs an additional, more permissive criterion of success, according to
which agents are successful if the best theory is at least as populated as any of the rivaling
theories.
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Figure 1: An example of an argumentative landscape consisting of 2 theories
(or research programs). Darker shaded nodes represent arguments that have
been investigated by agents and are thus visible to them; brighter shaded
nodes stand for arguments that aren’t visible to agents. The biggest node in
each theory is the root argument, from whcih agents start their exploration
via discovery relation, which connects arguments within one theory. Arrows
stand for attacks from an argument in one theory to an argument in another
theory (Borg et al., 2018b).
conditions. And while these findings appear contrary to conclusions drawn
from Zollman’s ABMs, the authors caution that structural differences be-
tween these ABMs may indicate that each model represents a specific kind
of inquiry. This is the first important exploratory result of ArgABM: differ-
ent ABMs of science may be representing different types of inquiry, which
means that more research should be done towards determining the specific
context of inquiry represented by each of the models.
Second, a recent iteration of ArgABM by Borg et al., 2018b examines
different evaluation procedures underlying theory-choice performed by sci-
entists. For instance, scientists may prefer a theory that has more defended
arguments than its rivals. Alternatively, they may prefer a theory that has a
lower number of undefended arguments (which can be understood as anoma-
lies in the given theory). As the authors show, these assessments may result
in different preference orders on the given theories, and in strikingly differ-
ent outcomes of the simulation. Hence, this result is a novel insight into
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a potential mechanism that may impact the efficiency of scientists. While
the link between the modeled evaluations and actual scientific practice (i.e.
evaluations underlying theory-choice performed by actual scientists) remains
an open question, this result points to the significance of a factor that has
previously often been omitted from ABMs of science.26
Before closing this section, let me add that one could argue that just like
Zollman’s model, ArgABM actually provides a proof-of-possibility for differ-
ent theoretical phenomena (the relation between the degree of connectedness
of scientists and their efficiency, the relative performance of different evalua-
tion procedures underlying theory-choice, etc.). Indeed, the two exploratory
functions discussed here are closely related: a proof-of-possibility may also
be an insight into a potential novel mechanism, and the other way around.
In fact, the exact function a model performs is largely a matter of the con-
text in which it is proposed, including initial motivations for developing the
model and ways in which it is employed: as the first model tackling a given
question, a model designed to test the robustness of previous proposals, etc.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed a class of highly-idealized ABMs of scientific
inquiry, proposed in the literature in philosophy of science and social epis-
temology, suggesting they should be considered as exploratory models. To
this end, I have argued that the majority of these models belong to the cat-
egory of theoretical abstractions, which means that what they represent is
unspecified. As a result, these models cannot be reliably used for drawing
inferences about actual scientific practice, at least as long as they don’t pass
an adequate validation procedure. Such a procedure consists in different
types of robustness analysis, guided by the process of empirically embedding
the model towards its purported target. Nevertheless, I have argued that
in the lack of such validation procedures, theoretical abstractions are still
epistemically valuable by being informative of theoretical phenomena, i.e.
by providing conceptual insights about scientific rationality and the process
of scientific inquiry.
Finally, it is important to notice that insights obtained by such ex-
ploratory ABMs might have been overlooked were these models immediately
calibrated towards concrete cases of scientific inquiry. This suggests that
exploratory ABMs are not just a preliminary stage in the development of
26An exception is the epistemic landscape ABM proposed by Currie and Avin, 2018,
which represents the diversity of methods preferred by scientists during their inquiry.
16
empirically validated models, merely providing the ground for an eventual
epistemic benefit. While they do play that role as well, their additional
function consists in providing conceptual explorations of scientific rational-
ity and revealing potential causal mechanisms underlying scientific inquiry,
which may remain a blind spot in those ABMs that are immediately infor-
mative of real-world phenomena.
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